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Abstract 
This study ascertained the direction and asymmetric pass-through of central bank‟s monetary financing to welfare in 
Nigeria using annual time series data covering the period 1970 to 2018. The study depended on both the Monetarist and 
Keynesian theoretical postulations to provide insights on the policy significance of monetary financing. To undertake 
the empirical analysis, the study applied both the linear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) and non-linear ARDL 
(NARDL) technique. Unlike the ARDL equation, the estimated NARDL equation established that welfare losses 
respond negatively to both positive and negative changes in monetary financing; but the impact of negative monetary 
financing shock (7.11) is greater than the positive shock (2.87). In addition, the study found that it takes about 9 to 11 
quarters for the changes in positive and negative monetary financing to fully release its effects on welfare loss. Besides, 
the results revealed that welfare loss is also driven by oil price, which is suggestive from oil price pass-through to 
domestic prices (exchange rate and consumer prices). The study, therefore, supports monetary financing in proper 
amounts and conditions to boost aggregate nominal demand but not to spur a fully-fledged monetary policy capture in 
the process.  
Keywords: monetary policy capture, government spending, monetary financing, welfare, autoregressive distributed lag, 
Nigeria 
JEL Classification: E31, E52, E62, I3, C32 
1. Introduction 
This study considers “monetary policy capture” as implying fiscal dominance, and sees it as whenever narrow interest 
of the fiscal actions capture the macroeconomic objective of monetary policy. And of the one of the primary goals of 
monetary policy is maintaining stable prices on a sustained basis, which is an essential condition for improving welfare 
(economic). According to Central bank of Nigeria (2017) and Ekpo, Asiama and Ahortor (2015), fiscal dominance 
refers to a regime where monetary policy ensures the solvency of the government, and in the process, loses the control 
over price stability objective to the concerns of accommodating high levels of public spending. As a result, high and 
volatile inflation occurs and the monetary authorities are unable to control it because of monetary policy subordination 
to fiscal dominance (Ekpo et al, 2015). This has attracted a growing line of thought on the influence of government 
fiscal dominance on monetary variables. Sargent and Wallace (1981) were among the first macroeconomists to provide 
insight into monetary policy capture in an environment where fiscal policy dominates the coordination game played 
between monetary and fiscal authorities. Studies by Tanner and Ramos (2002), Blanchard (2004), and Favero and 
Giavazzi (2004) also attributed high consumer prices to such subordination of monetary policy to fiscal needs. 
Participating in the discussion, Gallo and Otranto (1998), Frattiani and Spinell, (2001) and Sabatè, Gadea and Escario 
(2004) alluded that government spending is a critical factor in explaining the channel through which expected growth of 
the money stock affect prices of consumer goods and services. 
Another strand of literature on fiscal dominance relates to the ongoing central bank‟s monetary financing (see Benes & 
Kumhof, 2012; Mcculley & Poszar, 2013; Turner, 2013; Wolf, 2013; Dyson & Jackson, 2013; Muellbauer, 2014). In a 
narrow sense, this has to do with central bank money creation to specifically finance government spending, on a 
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permanent basis i.e. committing not to sterilize the effects and avoid the Ricardian equivalence problem1 (Reichlin et 
al., 2013). Bernanke (2003) supported such policies of monetary financing toward enhancing nominal Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in Japan, when he stated that “…Consider for example a tax cut for households and businesses that is 
explicitly coupled with incremental Bank of Japan purchases of government debt – so that the tax cut is in effect 
financed by money creation”. Hence, the recognition of monetary financing as a tool used by governments to reduce 
debt-to-GDP ratios when combined with higher inflation levels-cum-financial repression (Shaw 1973; Mckinnon 1973).  
The policy of significant monetary financing has historical antecedents in both Monetarist and Keynesian theoretical 
traditions. The early Chicago School economists such as, Fisher (1936) and Douglas, Fisher, Graham, Hamilton, King 
and Whittlesey (1939) argued that money creation should only be conducted by governments/central banks via a 
“full-reserve banking” policy. Besides, there is also the Keynes influenced equivalents of the “Functional Finance” 
approach of Lerner (1943) and Wray (1998, 2012)‟s “Modern Monetary Theory”. The modern monetary theory, in 
particular, emphasizes that since the ultimate source of monetary control resides with the treasury/central bank in a 
sovereign fiat-currency regime, it is inconsistent for governments to “borrow” via bond financing; rather there should be 
no limits on public expenditure to improve the economy using sovereign money creation (Ryan-Collins, 2015). 
Accordingly, Buiter (2014), Gali (2014) and Fry (1982) were of the view that constrained monetary policy is just a 
consequence of policy captured which the government purposefully executes in order to obtain „rents‟ from the general 
public at no net liability. Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) argued that the recent recession fighting response, such as the 
quasi-fiscal role and purchase of government debt by central banks is simply a practice of monetary policy 
subordination directed to help moderate the public debt, thereby lowering the real purchasing power of economic units. 
In terms of empirical interrogation, the evidence on policy capture remains mixed. Afolabi and Atolagbe (2018), Sanusi 
and Akinlo (2016), Oladipo and Akinbobola (2011) have established the absence of monetary policy capture in Nigeria; 
whilst Anfofum, Yahaya and Suleman (2015) and Ozurumba (2012) have reported its presence. From the rest of the 
world, there are empirical studies that substantiates the unsettled evidence of fiscal dominance: Chaudhary and Ahmad 
(1995), Jean-Claude (2005), De Resende and Rebei (2008), Makochekanwa, (2011), Keen and Wang (2013), and 
Koyuncu (2014) found monetary policy capture from fiscal actions, while Kaur (2018) provided contrary results. The 
dilemma between theoretical and empirical evidence has seen yet another strand of literature towards explaining this 
puzzle. In an attempt to address the issue, Buffie (1999) argued that the effect of public sector wage cycle underlies the 
weak correlation between monetary financing (fiscal deficits) and inflationary rate. Catao and Terrones (2005) linked 
the difficulties in finding a statistically significant and strong relationship between budget deficits and inflation to 
technical reasons: data samples (especially for advanced economies) and unsatisfactory modeling choice (with regard to 
developing countries). Unlike advanced nations, Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs) like Nigeria 
arguably have less policy space in managing their inter-temporal budget constraints owing largely to the absence of 
entrenched institutions that checks fiscal excesses, coupled with a central bank not convincingly committed to low 
inflation and a shallow financial market (Catao & Terrones, 2005; Canzoneri et al. 2001). 
But beyond this debate on the existence of fiscal interference in monetary space, there is this theoretical consensus on 
the inflationary effects of fiscal dominance. The proposition of macroeconomic theory is that, persistent fiscal 
dominance in form of budget deficits is inflationary (Sargent & Wallace, 1981) but this does not preclude other 
explanatory factors of inflation. Standard monetarist view is that price stability requires only an appropriate monetary 
policy. In a somewhat contrast way, Woodford‟s (1995) fiscal theory of price level argues that the choice of 
government on how to finance its deficits also strongly determines the time path of the inflation rate. In other words, 
fiscal actions affect the monetary authority‟s objective of price stability (Christiano & Fitzgerald, 2000; Kocherlakota & 
Phelan, 1999). Taking the discussion further, Sims (1999) & Woodford (1998) claimed that allowing the price level to 
fluctuate with unexpected fiscal (deficit) shocks can potentially generates net public finance benefits. But these 
expected public finance benefits can be mitigated with associated distortionary costs of price instability (Woodford, 
1998; Christiano & Fitzgerald, 2000). Consequently, the literature on EMDEs (Afolabi & Atolagbe, 2018; Kaur, 2018; 
Harshade 2009) has continued to keep the fiscal view of inflation in the limelight. And the significance of the 
deficit-inflation relationship debate in developing and high-inflation countries is drawn from fiscal conditions under 
which they operate: inefficient tax system, limited access to external borrowing and dependence on the inflation tax 
(Alesina & Drazen, 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Calvo &  e  gh, 1999). 
Though the welfare cost of inflation through decrease in household‟s consumption has been a fundamental issue in 
macroeconomics (Juin-Jen, Ching-Chong & Chih-Hsing, 2017), standard macroeconomics tend to underestimate the 
welfare losses by ignoring this arbitrary and unpredictable implicit tax from the deficit-inflation linkage (Hummel, 
                                                        
1 The public saving its excess money to pay for expected future tax increases that will be used to pay off the increasing 
debt-financed government spending.  
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2007). This is understandable because inflation‟s deadweight loss and its negative effect on net welfare seem to be a 
popular cost that attracts the attention of most economists (Mankiw, 1997). But that is only a part of the losses that 
concern the public. It is important to consider the tax transfers resulting from inflation – i.e. inflation‟s implicit tax on 
the public cash balances, in which the public unwillingly transfer some of their income into the hands of government. 
And given that the masses hold a higher proportion of their wealth in the form of cash balances than the rich, the 
incidence of this implicit tax is regressive. In other words, inflation tax has a welfare cost effect (Cooley & Hansen, 
1989). There is, therefore, the need to characterizes price stability as a fundamental social goal and mind the underlying 
related costs of fiscal dominance (Cochrane, 1998), especially as there is deliberate need to recourse to inflation tax in  
most EMDEs under a relatively large informal sector, which cannot be directly taxed. This paper thus contributes to 
literature with quantitative evidence on the existence of a dynamic causal link between central bank monetary financing 
(of public deficits) and welfare losses (inflation tax).  
To achieve this, this study applied a single case study on Nigeria. This choice of Nigeria is based mainly on its price 
level fluctuation, pro-cyclical fiscal policy with high public deficits, low tax ratios, and monetary financing credentials. 
The study, therefore, assumes the use of Non-Ricardian fiscal policies in Nigeria where the real value of government 
debt is expected to grow unsustainably and adjustments to fiscal and monetary policy is made to keep it under control 
(Christiano & Fitzgerald,2000), and the condition of pro-cyclical policies in an oil exporting economy as modelled by 
Jalali, Naini and Naderian (2018). Since the stationarity of variables were a combination of I(0) & I(1), the study 
adapted the ARDL and Non-linear ARDL (NARDL) approach of Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) to test 
whether welfare losses respond asymmetrically to Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)‟s monetary financing changes. The 
results suggest that there is a positive relationship between asymmetry of monetary financing and welfare losses and 
that the latter takes about 9 to 11 quarters to fully respond to both a positive and negative monetary financing change.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In section 2, the study laid out the empirical literature. Section 3, 
presents the methodology adopted, the results obtained from the estimation of the model and discussed the welfare 
effect of monetary policy from fiscal dominance. Section 4, concludes with policy recommendations that follow suit. 
2. Empirical Literature 
The above discussion highlights conduct in which policy choices (fiscal and monetary) may affect consumer prices, and 
by extension, welfare. An empirical work is desirable to identify the actual magnitudes of potential welfare effects of 
monetary financing. A number of studies have attempted to analysis this relationship. The following are some of the 
studies reviewed based on their methodology and results: 
Author Country Objective Method of Study Findings 
Afolabi and 
Atolagbe (2018) 
Nigeria Analyse fiscal 
dominance and the 
conduct of monetary 
policy 
Vector Error Correction 
Mechanism (VECM) and 
Cointegration test. Quarterly 
data series from 1986Q1 – 
2016Q4. 
No evidence of fiscal 
dominance in Nigeria. 
Even as budget deficits 
have significant impact 
on money supply. 
Sanusi and 
Akinlo (2016) 
Nigeria Investigate fiscal 
dominance in 
Nigeria. 
Structural Vector 
Autoregressive (SVAR) 
approach. Annual data series 
from 1986 – 2013. 
No causality running 
from fiscal deficits to 
growth of monetary base 
in Nigeria. 
Anfofum, Yahaya 
and Suleman 
(2015) 
Nigeria Analysis of fiscal 
deficits – inflation 
relationship. 
Cointegration, Granger 
causality and Error Correction 
techniques. Annual data series 
from 2008 – 2012. 
Unidirectional 
relationship that runs 
from fiscal deficits to 
inflation. 
Bakare, 
Adesanya and 
Bolarinwa 
(2014) 
Nigeria Examined the link 
between budget 
deficit, inflation and 
money supply. 
Cointegration and Error 
Correction model instruments 
based on annual data series 
from 1980 – 2012. 
Established long-run 
inflation to be highly 
dependent on fiscal 
deficits in Nigeria. 
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Ozurumba 
(2012) 
Nigeria Assessed the causal 
relationship 
between fiscal 
policy and inflation. 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL). Annual data series 
from 1970 – 2009. 
Corroborates Oladipo 
and Akinbobola‟s 
(2011) findings that 
there was no causal 
connection between 
fiscal deficit and 
inflation. 
Kur (2018) India Test the fiscal 
deficit-inflation 
relationship 
Johansen Cointegration 
technique with Granger 
causality test. Annual data 
series from 1970/71 – 2014/15 
No presence of fiscal 
theory of price in India.  
Makochekanwa 
(2011) 
Zim
babwe 
Studied the deficit - 
inflation nexus. 
Johansen Cointegration 
approach using annual data 
series from 1980 – 2005. 
Budget deficit 
significantly influence 
inflation due to 
monetization of fiscal 
spending. 
De 
Resende and 
Rebei (2008) 
Canada, U.S., 
Mexico, and 
South Korea 
Examined the 
welfare implications 
of fiscal dominance. 
Bayesian techniques, using 
quarterly data series: Canada 
(1957Q1−2005Q1), Mexico 
(1982Q1−2005Q4), South 
Korea (1970Q2−2000Q3), and 
the United States 
(1957Q1−2006Q1 
Absence of fiscal 
dominance in Canada 
and the U.S., unlike in 
Mexico and South 
Korea. And high fiscal 
dominance leads to 
significant welfare 
losses. 
Jean-Claude 
(2005) 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
Analysis of fiscal 
dominance and 
inflation 
relationship. 
Multivariate Cointegration and 
VECM. Annual data series 
from 1981 – 2003 
Positive and significant 
relationship between 
budget deficits and 
seigniorage, and 
between money creation 
and inflation in the 
long-run. 
Chaudhary and 
Ahmad (1995) 
Pakistan Investigated the 
relationship 
between money 
supply, fiscal deficit 
and inflation. 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method. Annual data series 
from 1973 - 1992. 
Corroborates Koyuncu 
(2014) findings that 
there exists a 
bi-directional causality 
between budget deficit 
and inflation in the long 
run. 
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From the empirical literature reviewed, research evidence has been mixed in uncovering this relationship. This present 
study revisits the welfare issue surrounding the presence of fiscal deficit vis-a-vis monetary policy capture in Nigeria.  
3. Methodology 
The augmented Nachega (2005)‟s data generating process of welfare loss due to macroeconomic variables is as follows: 
                                       (1) 
where W_LO is the current welfare loss: defined as the reduction in economic well-being or failure to attain determined 
social utility because marginal social benefits varies from the marginal social cost, MF is the central bank monetary 
finance, EXCR is the Bureau de Change (BDC) exchange rate, CON is the household aggregate consumption, and 
OIL_P is the Bonny Light oil price which is incorporated into the model as a short-term determinant of welfare effect. 
The welfare loss is estimated using real money balances approach by Dowd (1994), where higher inflation transmitting 
to higher money price (interest rate), drives economic agents to cut real balances and for this reason, welfare loss ensues 
from an inflation-induced decrease in real balances holdings (Driffil et al. 1990). And because the social cost of 
producing real balances stay unchanged, variation in welfare loss is then accounted for by real balances effect. 
According to Dowd (1994), the quantification of the W_LO of an inflation-induced fall in real balances is therefore 
expressed as: 
                                       ⁄                      (2) 
Where π is CPI and   m is monetary aggregate (M1). This implies that if inflation rises from   to   , and real 
money balances fall as a result from   by an amount   , the W_LO is given by the Area A + B in Figure 1. 
 
Source: Adopted from Dowd (1994) 
 
Figure 1. Inflation and the Demand for Real Balances 
 
This paper, therefore, looks at monetary finance and welfare effect in Nigeria over the period 1970 – 2018 using annual 
time-series data. The choice of the period for this study is informed by the availability of data sourced from CBN 
Statistical Bulletin (2018) and World Bank Development Indicators (2018). The descriptive statistics is shown in 
Appendix. 
 
3.1 Non-Stationarity and Stationarity Tests 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) is applied in order to check the integrating properties of the investigated variables. 
The null hypothesis for ADF is 0 : 0H    while the alternative is 
2
1 : 0H   . Z-test is then used for this hypothesis 
testing in ADF. 
3.2 Linear ARDL Model 
This study uses Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) in the estimation of the relationship between monetary 
policy capture and welfare effect. The ARDL model specification of the above functional form is; 
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Where is difference operator, k is the lag length and  is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. The cointegration 
test is based on the F-statistics. The error correction representation is specified as follows: 
  𝐿𝑂𝑡   𝜎𝑜  ∑𝜎1𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
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𝑘
𝑖=1
    𝑡−𝑖  ∑𝜎4𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
    𝑃𝑡−𝑖  𝜆   
  𝜀                                                                                                                                                                             4  
Where  is the speed of adjustment parameter and error correction term (ECM) is the residuals obtained from equation 
4. The coefficient of the lagged error correction term ( ) is expected to be negative and statistically significant to 
further confirm the existence of a cointegrating relationship. And t  is an error term, which is a . .i i d (0, ) process. 
3.3 NARDL Bounds Model 
Following ARDL model, the NARDL approach is as follows: 
      𝑡     𝛿1    𝑡   𝛿2       𝑡   𝛿3     𝑡   𝛿3       𝑡  𝜀𝑡  (5) 
Where ln denotes the natural logarithms of the variables, and the variables as defined earlier. Based on the studies by 
Park and Phillips (2001), Bae and de Jong (2007), Apergis (2015) and the recent study by Usman, and Elsalih (2018), we 
specify the nonlinear ARDL by disintegrating the independent variables into their positive and negative sums as follows: 
 𝑡
  ∑    
  ∑        
𝑡
 =1    
𝑡
 =1   and  𝑡
−  ∑    
−  ∑        
𝑡
 =1    
𝑡
 =1  (6) 
where  𝑡 represents    𝑡.   𝑡
  and   𝑡
−are perhaps the sum of the positive and negative shocks in government fiscal 
dominance level. The presence of the short-run symmetry (    −  and long-run symmetry      −) for all the 
variables is ascertained by using bounds test and statistical significance. The lag order of the dependent and independent 
variables is represented by   and   respectively. To examine the long-run asymmetric cointegration among the 
variables, Shin et al. (2014) proposed two operational tests, which include the bounds testing procedure of Pesaran, et al. 
(2001) through a modified F-statistic   𝑃   with        
   −     The second test is the t-statistic (      
proposed by Banerjee et al. (1998). The cointegration test is conducted using the level variables. If the computed 
statistic is greater than the upper bound critical value, the    is rejected, which indicates the existence of a long-run 
relationship among variables.  
The framework for Nonlinear ARDL error correction form as advanced by Shin et al. (2014) based on our study is 
provided in equation 7: 
       𝑡            𝑡−1   1
     𝑡−1
   2
−    𝑡−1
  ∑  1
 
𝑖=1        𝑡−𝑖  ∑  2
 
𝑖=      𝑡−𝑖
  
∑  3
 
𝑖=      𝑡−𝑖
−   ∑  4
 
𝑖=        𝑡  ∑  5
 
𝑖=       𝑡  ∑  5
 
𝑖=         𝑡    𝑡    (7) 
Where  𝑖 represents the short-run coefficients and  𝑖represents the long-run coefficients respectively. The first part of 
equation (6) estimates the long-run coefficients while the second part estimates the short-run coefficients. Specifically, 
the positive and negative long-run asymmetric coefficients are computed based on   
        and   
−    −  , 
while the positive and negative short-run coefficients are given as ∑  2
 
𝑖=     𝑡−𝑖
  and ∑  3
 
𝑖=     𝑡−𝑖
− .  
 
  
 t
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3.4 Presentation of Results and Analysis  
 
Table 1. Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) Test 
Variables At Level First 
Difference 
Order of 
Cointegration 
Ln W_LO    
Intercept 3.063206 -13.28812*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend -1.605072 -1.605072  
Ln MF    
Intercept 4.701261 -3.104049** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend -0.822670 -0.822670  
Ln EXCR    
Intercept 0.346486 -7.236390*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend -1.792931 -7.514926  
Ln OIL_P    
Intercept 3.063206 -6.964256*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend -1.605072 -6.888488  
LnCON    
Intercept 0.012402 -8.637446*** I(1) 
Intercept & Trend -1.317489 -8.875010  
Notes: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels at which the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is 
rejected for all tests. The intercept and trend and intercept are included in the levels and the first difference equations. 
The optimal lag order are selected based on Schwarz information Criterion (SIC). 
Source: Extract from results 
 
Table 1 shows that the series are not stationary at level I(0) but stationary after first difference i.e. I(1) based on ADF 
test. This necessitates the application of the Bounds test for variables cointegration in the ARDL /NARDL model. 
 
Table 2. Bounds Test for Linear ARDL and Non-Linear ARDL (NARDL) 
Linear ARDL NARDL 
Model: Model: 
F(W_LO/MF, EXCR, CON, OIL_P)  F(W_LO/MF(NEG), MF(POS), EXCR,CONS, OIL_P) 
Critical value  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Critical value  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1% 3.29 4.37 1% 3.06 4.15 
5% 2.56 3.49 5% 2.39 3.38 
10% 2.2 3.09 10% 2.08 3.00 
F-Statistics 8.944177 F-Statistics 8.405387 
Critical values from Narayan (2005) 
Source: Extract from results 
 
Table 2 shows that the f-statistic at 8.94 and 8.41 for the Linear ARDL and Non-Linear ARDL, respectively, is greater 
than the critical values at 1%. This implies that there exists cointegration among the variables under consideration. 
Given the presence of cointegration amongst the variables, long-run dynamics can be evaluated. 
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Table 3. Estimated Long-run Coefficients of Welfare Effect of Asymmetric Monetary Financing 
Linear ARDL Model NARDL Model 
Variable Coefficient p-value Variable Coefficient p-value 
MF 1.3025 0.0584 MF(POS) -2.8721 0.0017 
   MF(NEG) -7.1070 0.0290 
EXCR -1.5825 0.8495 EXCR 13.4295 0.0525 
CON 0.0333 0.0002 CON 0.0068 0.0598 
OIL_P 61.8560 0.0775 OIL_P -26.9622 0.2014 
C -5669.0530 0.0000 C -526.2728 0.3396 
ECM(-1)  -1.521319 0.0066 ECM(-1) -6.887545 0.0001 
Source: Extract from results 
  
The results of the long-term equations in Table 3 are mixed. The estimated linear ARDL model shows that monetary 
financing accelerates welfare loss through high inflation. Welfare loss is also driven by oil price, which might be from 
pass-through to domestic prices (exchange rate and consumer prices). Foreign exchange rate, however, has moderating 
effect on welfare loss but not is not significant.  
For the estimated NARDL model, both positive and negative monetary finance shocks reduce welfare loss but the 
impact of negative monetary financing shock (7.11) is greater than the positive shock (2.87), indicating monetary 
finance stimulation of aggregate nominal demand. This entails that monetary financing in Nigeria matter, and is used in 
appropriate quantities and circumstance of low-employment economy as suggested by Turner (2015). From the result, a 
change in foreign exchange rate would increase welfare loss. This conforms to reported channels: spillover effects on 
imbalances, inflation, and output gap (Engel, 2014); expectation, habit persistence, and asymmetric asset markets 
(Bergin & Tchakarov, 2003); and existence of multi-exchange rate system (Donald, 1975). Oil price lowers welfare loss 
in estimated NARDL model but its effect is not significant. 
Consumption is not quantitatively significant in both the linear and non-linear ARDL model; this outcome points 
toward the presence of negative externalities and myopic behaviour (Abrardi & Cambini, 2018). Importantly, the 
variations in the results of the Linear ARDL and NARDL models brings to light the need for choosing appropriate 
methodological approach to profitably ensure reliability of results and optimal policy implication. Besides, the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium for both linear and non-linear ARDL is negatively signed as required – estimated at 1.52% 
and 6.88%, respectively and statistically significant at 1 per cent. 
 
Table 4. Diagnostic Test 
Linear ARDL NARDL 
LM Test F-statistic Prob. F-statistic Prob. 
Coefficients 0.750959 0.4827 1.893680 0.2442 
Heteroskedasticity Test ARCH 
Coefficients 0.258642 0.6138 0.249448 0.6202 
Source: Extract from results 
 
The diagnostic tests of serial correlation Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) presented in Table 4 failed to established serial correlation and was unsuccessful to reject homoscedasticity in 
the data using the Breusch-Pagan (19802) LM test and ARCH test at lag 1. To ascertain the stability of the coefficients 
of all variables in the models, the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of square (CUSUMSQ) were carried 
                                                        
2Breusch, T.S., and Pagan, A.R. (1980), “The Lagrange Multiplier Test and its Application to Model Specifications in 
Econometrics”, Review of Economic Studies, 47, 239-53 
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out using Brown et al (19753) model stability tests and the graphs are presented in Figure 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b. The 
movement of the recursive residuals oscillated within and outside the critical bounds. Overall, plots of the CUSUM 
suggest that the regression equation were stable considering that the CUSUM test statistic does not go beyond the 
bounds of the 5% and 2% level of significance for Linear ARDL and NARDL, respectively. And those behaviors of the 
coefficients of CUSUMSQ have the capacity to equilibrate in the long-run horizon. Further, taking a cue from Shin et al 
(20144), the study extracted long-run cumulative dynamic multipliers following asymmetric change to the monetary 
financing and how the changes impact welfare loss. Figure 4 shows that welfare losses take about 9 to 11 quarters to 
react to a unit change (increase and decrease) in the monetary financing. 
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Figure 4. Dynamic Multiplier Graph 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study on monetary policy capture and welfare is motivated by theoretical consensus that monetary financing 
causes inflation, and the potential benefits of leading empirical literature to welfare cost of implicit tax inflation. The 
                                                        
3Brown, R.L., J. Durbin, and Evans, J.M. (1975), “Techniques for Testing the Constancy of Regression Relations Over 
Time,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 37, 149-163. 
4Shin, Y., Yu, B. and Greenwood-Nimmo, M. (2014). Modelling Asymmetric Cointegration and Dynamic Multipliers 
in an ARDL Framework. In: Horrace, W.C., Sickles, R.C. (eds), Festschrift in Honor of Peter Schmidt. Springer 
Science and Business Media, New York. 
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choice of a single case of Nigeria is based on its high public deficits, low tax ratios, monetary finance credentials, and 
high consumer prices. In order to ascertain the direction of this dynamics, the study evaluated the validity of the 
pass-through of monetary financing to welfare loss in Nigeria from 1970 to 2018, using both the linear and Non-linear 
ARDL techniques. 
The findings of the estimated long-run linear ARDL model reveal that welfare loss responds positively to monetary 
financing and is statistically significant at 10%, thus, suggesting that, welfare loss is sensitive to changes in monetary 
financing. For the estimated non-linear ARDL model, both positive and negative changes in monetary financing was 
found to have asymmetric (magnitude) and negative impact on welfare loss whilst the impact of negative monetary 
financing shock (7.11) is greater than the positive shock (2.87). The relationship is statistically significant at 5% and 
10%, for positive and negative shocks, respectively. The difference in the results of Linear ARDL and NARDL model 
emphasizes the need for an adequate method to correctly produce reliable or repeatable empirical results. The results of 
the NARDL model established that monetary finance matters in reducing welfare loss in Nigeria, which supports Gali‟s 
(2014) assertion that “if the steady state is sufficiently inefficient, an increase in government purchases financed by 
money creation may increase welfare even if such spending is wasteful”. The study also found that it takes about 9 to 11 
quarters for the positive and negative monetary financing changes to fully unleash its effects on welfare losses. Besides, 
the results reveal that welfare loss is also driven by oil price, which is suggestive from oil price pass-through to 
domestic prices (exchange rate and consumer prices). 
Given that Nigeria‟s economy is still operating below full employment, this study agrees with Turner (2015) that 
monetary financing is required, and supported in appropriate quantities and circumstances to drive aggregate nominal 
demand and welfare. However, monetary financing (of government spending or deficits) should be guided by proven 
rules and responsibilities restraining the central bank to avoid monetary policy capture and its potentially adverse 
side-effects. 
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Appendix: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 EXCR 
(N/USD) 
MF 
(BILLION) 
CON 
(BILLION) 
OIL_P 
(USD/PB) WELFARE_LOSS 
 Mean  89.66131  1723.521  219412.0  36.09563  3841.446 
 Median  80.14500  325.6570  152033.0  26.60000  184.1645 
 Maximum  455.2600  13697.00  474932.4  114.4900  62230.52 
 Minimum  0.796528  0.215000  84094.35  2.650000 -2337.237 
 Std. Dev.  106.1765  3404.249  129667.3  29.68310  10389.56 
 Skewness  1.513411  2.243625  0.926549  1.326941  4.346043 
 Kurtosis  5.359664  6.947362  2.217207  3.860999  23.23055 
      
 Jarque-Bera  29.45934  71.43415  8.093480  15.56883  969.6553 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.017479  0.000416  0.000000 
      
 Sum  4303.743  82729.02  10531774  1732.590  184389.4 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  529852.5  5.45E+08  7.90E+11  41411.05  5.07E+09 
      
 Observations  48  48  48  48  48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to the journal.  
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly 
cited. 
